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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis on merger activities in the industry composed
of one public ﬁrm and two private ﬁrms. Such an industry is usually referred to as mixed oligopoly, or
more speciﬁcally mixed triopoly. The literature on mixed oligopoly can be traced back to the paper of De
Fraja and Delbono (1989). Although there have been many analyses of a merger in private oligopoly (e.g.
Salant et al. (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990)), not so many efforts
have been carried out in studying merger activities in mixed oligopoly. Exceptions are Ba´rcena-Ruiz and
Ga´rzon (2003), and Coloma (2006). Both of the papers analyzed a merger in mixed duopoly, i.e. a merger
in the industry composed of a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm. In the paper of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon,
the two ﬁrms were assumed to produce heterogeneous products and the decision to merge by the ﬁrms
was analyzed. On the other hand, in his paper, Coloma considered the case where the two ﬁrms produce
homogeneous products and made welfare comparisons among possible market structures.
There are two respects in which our paper contributes to the literature on mergers in mixed oligopoly.
First, although neither of the papers of Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Ga´rzon nor of Coloma considered a synergy
effect of a merger, we assume that a merger yields a synergy effect to the technology of the merged ﬁrm
and entails the improvement on productivity. Without assuming any synergy effects of a merger, Ba´rcena-
Ruiz and Ga´rzon obtained the result that, in their setting, both of the private ﬁrm and the public ﬁrm want
to merge only when the degree to which the two heterogeneous products are substitutes is sufﬁciently low
and, moreover, the merger does not take place when the two products are perfectly substitutable. Since,
in the real world, there are many examples of mergers among ﬁrms which produce highly substitutable
products, this result is counterintuitive to what we would expect. In this paper, we re-examine the mergers
among the ﬁrms producing homogeneous, i.e. perfectly substitutable, products in mixed triopoly under the
assumption that a merger yields the improvement on productivity. It seems very natural to assume that the
merger between the ﬁrms that produce highly substitutable heterogeneous products entails a synergy effect
because merger participants may easily learn a strong point of each ﬁrm’s production skill and/or their
patents from one another. In the study of the horizontal mergers in private oligopoly, Farrell and Shapiro
(1990) showed that the merger could improve social welfare if the merged ﬁrm exploits economies of
scale well. In order to analyze mergers that entail the improvement on productivity, we follow McAfee
and Williams (1992). In our paper, the technology of each of the three ﬁrms is identically represented
by the quadratic cost function C(qi) = q2i , where qi is the amount of the production of the ﬁrm i, and,
as considered in the paper of McAfee and Williams, the merged ﬁrm operates the plants which were
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previously owned by the pre-merged ﬁrms most efﬁciently and thus the technology is represented by
C(q) = q2=n, where q is the amount of the output of the merged ﬁrm and n (= 2;3) is the number of
the merger participants. Such a cost function of the merged ﬁrm clearly shows that a merger entails the
improvement on productivity.
The other respect in which our analysis is clearly distinguished from the earlier ones is that we espe-
cially focus on the stability of market structures. We extend the usual way of analysis of mergers where
solely the decision to merge by the ﬁrms is discussed. In this paper, we treat merger activities as coalition
formations among the ﬁrms that are allowed to freely merge and freely break off the merger . For example,
the merger between ﬁrms, say 0 and 1, with leaving a ﬁrm, say 2, standing alone can be considered as the
coalition formation of ff0;1g;f2gg. Viewing merger activities as coalition formations among the ﬁrms,
to ﬁnd the stable coalition formations, i.e. stable market structures, is of our interest. In order to analyze
the stability of market structures, we adopt the core, the well-established solution concept in cooperative
game theory and examine which of all possible market structures is/are stable in the sense that once any
of such market structures is actually realized none of the owners of the ﬁrms wants to change this present
market structure by merging with other ﬁrm or breaking off the merger.
The motivation to analyze the stability problem of merger activities perhaps needs some elaboration.
In our paper, we consider the industry of mixed triopoly. In the mixed triopoly market, the variation
of possible forms of a merger among the ﬁrms increases and becomes more complicated than in mixed
duopoly. Consequently, it might be the case that, while the owners of some two ﬁrms, say 0 and 1, have
an incentive to merge into one ﬁrm by comparing their payoffs obtained in each of the initial market
structure, i.e. the coalition structure ff0g;f1g;f2gg, and the one realized after the merger, i.e. f f0,1g
,f 2g g, the owner of the ﬁrm 0 could receive higher payoff if s/he breaks off the merger with the ﬁrm 1
and alternatively merges with the ﬁrm 2, i.e. in the structure ff0;2g;f1gg, than in the case of the merger
with the ﬁrm 1. In this case, if the owner of the ﬁrm 2 also has an incentive to merge with the ﬁrm 0, the
merger between the ﬁrms 0 and 2 will be realized, and the merger between the ﬁrms 0 and 1 can never
be realized. Therefore, in the presence of more than two ﬁrms, it is not sufﬁcient to analyze the decision
to merge in each particular case, and we should examine merger activities in terms of stable coalition
formations. In the literature on mergers in private oligopoly, Barros (1998), Horn and Persson (2001), and
Straume (2006) adopted the same approach. However, with the only exception of Kamijo and Nakamura
(2007), there has not been any works that analyze mergers in mixed oligopoly along the approach using
the core property. This paper shows that, in our mixed triopoly model, the core of market structures is
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non-empty and the core consists solely of the market structures derived by the merger between a public
ﬁrm and one of the two private ﬁrms with about 0:57 share ratio by the public ﬁrm.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces our model and presents the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium for each of four regimes; mixed triopoly; merger between private ﬁrms; merger between
a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm; and merger among all the three ﬁrms. Our results are provided in Section
3. Section 4 concludes with some remarks.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Set-up of Mixed Oligopoly
We analyze stable market structures in the industry composed of one public ﬁrm, denoted by 0, and
two private ﬁrms, 1 and 2. Each ﬁrm produces a single homogeneous good and is assumed to be en-
trepreneurial one, i.e. the owners themselves make every managerial decision making. The public ﬁrm
(resp. each of the private ﬁrms) is owned by the government (resp. a single private shareholder). In accor-
dance with whether a merger among the ﬁrms is realized or not, we have four possible market regimes:
(a) mixed triopoly ff0g;f1g;f2gg, (b) merger between private ﬁrms ff0g;f1;2gg, (c) merger between a
public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm ff0; ig;f jgg (i; j = 1;2; i 6= j), and (d) merger among all the three ﬁrms
ff0;1;2gg. Although the details of the formal descriptions of the four regimes are slightly different, we
mainly introduce the set-up of the mixed triopoly. The other regimes are easily understand as an extension
of the mixed triopoly.
The inverse demand function is linear in the total output Q,
P(Q) = a¡Q; (1)
where a is sufﬁciently large positive number. As assumed in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003), each ﬁrm
i (= 0;1;2) has an identical technology represented by the quadratic cost function
C(qi) = q2i ; (2)
where qi is the quantity of the good produced by the ﬁrm i. The proﬁt function of the ﬁrm i (= 0;1;2) is
given as:
Pi = (a¡Q)qi¡q2i : (3)
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As usual, social welfareW is measured by the sum of consumer surplus CS= Q2=2, and ﬁrms’ proﬁts.
In their paper, Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n have not discussed the case where a merger yields the
improvement on productivity. The proiductivity-improving merger has been analyzed in McAfee and
Williams (1992). As in the paper of McAfee and Williams and also in Nakamura and Inoue (2007), we
consider that a merged ﬁrm shows the improvement on productivity. The market regimes derived by
mergers, i.e. (b), (c), and (d), show the differences particularly in the forms of cost functions. If n (= 2;3)
ﬁrms merge into one ﬁrm, the total cost of the merged ﬁrm Cm is represented as:
Cm(qm) =
q2m
n
; (4)
where qm is the output of the merged ﬁrm m. Such a cost function is supported by the assumption that the
merged ﬁrm adopts the most efﬁcient operation plan of the plants previously owned by the pre-merged
ﬁrms. The proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm is given by replacing q2i with q
2
m=n in (3).
2.2 Four Regimes and Cournot Equilibria
We now examine the Cournot equilibrium for each regimes. Let U ri denote an objective function that
the ﬁrm i maximizes in the regime r (= a;b;c;d). In the rest of the paper, functions and variables with
superscript r (= a;b;c;d) denote those considered in the regime r.
(a) Mixed triopoly ff0g;f1g;f2gg: In this regime, each of the three ﬁrms has the following objective
function, respectively:
Ua0 (q
a
0;q
a
1;q
a
2) =W
a = 12
¡
qa0+å
2
i=1 q
a
i
¢2+P0+å2i=1Pi; (5)
Uai (q
a
i ;q
a
0;q
a
j) =Pi; (i; j = 1;2 and i 6= j): (6)
The ﬁrst order conditions of the maximization problems give the following Cournot equilibrium:
qa¤0 =
3
13a and q
a¤
i =
2
13a (i= 1;2):
Therefore, in the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following equilibrium proﬁts Pai , consumer surplus,
and social welfare:
Pa0 =
9
169a
2; Pai =
8
169a
2 (i= 1;2); CSa = 49338a
2; W a = 99338a
2:
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The payoffs to the owners of the ﬁrms, denoted by V ai (i= 0;1;2), are
V a0 =W
a
0 =
99
338a
2; V ai =Pai =
8
169a
2 (i= 1;2):
(b) Merger between private ﬁrms ff0g;f1;2gg: Next, we consider the case where the two private
ﬁrms merge into a new private ﬁrm denoted by 12. Let qb12 be the amount of the output of the merged ﬁrm
12. The objective of the merged ﬁrm 12 is to maximize its proﬁt:
Ub12(q
b
12;q
b
0) =P12 =
£
a¡ (qb0+qb12)
¤
qb12¡ 12(qb12)2: (7)
The objective function of the public ﬁrm is:
Ub0 (q
b
0;q
b
12) =W
b =CSb+P0+P12 (8a)
= 12(q
b
0+q
b
12)
2+(a¡qb0+qb12)qb0¡ (qb0)2+
£
a¡ (qb0+qb12)
¤
qb12¡ 12(qb12)2: (8b)
Note that, in the last term of its proﬁt function, the merged ﬁrm 12 shows the improvement on productivity.
In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qb¤0 =
1
4a; q
b¤
12 =
1
4a; P
b
0 =
1
16a
2; Pb12 =
3
32a
2; CSb = 18a
2; W b = 932a
2:
Let a 2 [0;1] be a ratio of shareholding by the owner of the ﬁrm 1 in the merged ﬁrm 12. Then, the payoff
to the owner of the public ﬁrm 0, V b0 , and those to the pre-merged private ﬁrms 1 and 2, V
b
1 and V
b
2 , are
V b0 =W
b = 932a
2; V b1 = aP
b
12 =
3
32aa
2; V b2 = (1¡a)Pb12 = 332(1¡a)a2:
(c) Merger between a public ﬁrm and a private ﬁrm ff0; ig;fjgg: In this regime the public ﬁrm 0
and one of the private ﬁrms i (= 1 or 2) merge into a new ﬁrm 0i. Let qc0i and P
c
0i denote the output and
proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm 0i. As the objective function of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i, we consider
the weighted average of social welfare and the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm:
Uc0i(q
c
0i;q
c
j) = bW
c+(1¡b )P0i
= b
£1
2(q
c
0i+q
c
j)
2+P0i+P j
¤
+(1¡b )P0i; (i; j = 1;2 and i 6= j) (9)
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where b 2 [0;1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged ﬁrm 0i and P0i and P j are the
proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms 0i and j, respectively, given as:
P0i =
£
a¡ (qc0i+qcj)
¤
qc0i¡ 12(qc0i)2; (10)¡
Ucj (q
c
j;q
c
0i)´
¢
P j =
£
a¡ (qc0i+qcj)
¤
qcj¡ (qcj)2: (11)
The weighted average of social welfare and the proﬁt in the objective of a public-private merged ﬁrm has
ﬁrst been suggested in Matsumura (1998) and also been adopted in Ba´rcena-Ruiz and Garzo´n (2003). In
the Cournot equilibrium of this regime, we get:
qc¤0i =
3
11¡4b a; q
c¤
j =
(2¡b )
11¡4b a; P
c
0i =
9(3¡2b )
2(11¡4b )2 a
2; Pcj =
2(2¡b )2
(11¡4b )2 a
2;
CSc = (5¡b )
2
2(11¡4b )2 a
2; W c = (68¡44b+5b
2)
2(11¡4b )2 a
2:
The payoffs to the owners of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0 and pre-merged private ﬁrm i, V c0 and V
c
i , are
V c0 =W
c = (68¡44b+5b
2)
2(11¡4b )2 a
2; V ci = (1¡b )Pc0i = 9(3¡2b )(1¡b )2(11¡4b )2 a2;
and the one to the owner of the non-merged private ﬁrm j 6= i, V cj , is
V cj =Pcj =
2(2¡b )2
(11¡4b )2 a
2:
(d) Merger among all the three ﬁrms ff0;1;2gg: Finally, we examine the case where all of the three
ﬁrms, 0, 1, and 2, merge into one ﬁrm denoted by 012. In the similar way to the regime (c), the objective
function of the merged ﬁrm is deﬁned as follows:
Ud012(q
d
012) = gW
d +(1¡ g)P012 (12a)
= g
¡1
2(q
d
012)
2+P012
¢
+(1¡ g)P012; (12b)
where g 2 [0;1] is a ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged ﬁrm 012 and P012 is the proﬁt
function of the merged ﬁrm given as:
P012 = (a¡qd012)qd012¡ 13(qd012)2: (13)
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Note that the merged ﬁrm in this regime shows further improvement on productivity than in the regimes
(b) and (c). In the Cournot equilibrium, we obtain the following:
qd¤012 =
3
8¡3g a; P
d
012 =
3(4¡3g)
(8¡3g)2 a
2; CSd = 92(8¡3g)2 a
2; W d = 3(11¡6g)2(8¡3g)2 a
2:
The payoffs to the owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms, V di (i= 0;1;2), are
V d0 =W
d = 3(11¡6g)2(8¡3g)2 a
2;
V d1 = (1¡ g)dPd012 = 3(4¡3g)(1¡g)d(8¡3g)2 a2; V d2 = (1¡ g)(1¡d )Pd012 =
3(4¡3g)(1¡g)(1¡d )
(8¡3g)2 a
2;
where d 2 [0;1] measures a ratio of proﬁt distribution among the private sector, i.e. (1¡ g)d is a ratio of
shareholding by the owner of the ﬁrm 1 in the merged ﬁrm 012.
Table 1 summarizes objective functions and payoffs of the ﬁrms in each of the four regimes.
Table 1: Firms’ objectives and owners’ payoffs
regime (r) ﬁrms’ objectives: U ri owners’ payoffs: V
r
i
regime (a)
Ua0 =W
a
Ua1 =P1
Ua2 =P2
V a1 =W
a(qa¤)
V a1 =P1(q
a¤)
V a2 =P2(q
a¤)
regime (b)
Ub0 =W
b
Ub12 =P12
V b0 =W
b(qb¤)
V b1 = aP12(q
b¤)
V b2 = (1¡a)P12(qb¤)
regime (c)
Uc0i = bW
c+(1¡b )P0i (i= 1;2)
Ucj =P j ( j 6= i)
V c0 =W
c(qc¤)
V ci = (1¡b )P0i(qc¤)
V cj =P j(q
c¤)
regime (d) Ud012 = gW
d +(1¡ g)P012
V d0 =W
d(qd¤)
V d1 = (1¡ g)dP012(qd¤)
V d2 = (1¡ g)(1¡d )P012(qd¤)
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2.3 Market Structures and the Core
Each of the four regimes, except for the mixed triopoly which itself represents the market structure,
includes more than one market structure, each of which can be identiﬁed in terms of shareholding ratio
in the merged ﬁrm and of merger participants, i.e. a coalition formation. For example, in the regime (c),
we can ﬁnd one particular market structure that is composed of the merged ﬁrm 01 with the government’s
shareholding b = 0:5 and the private ﬁrm 2. Which of the possible market structures will actually occur
fairly depends on the managerial decision making of the three owners of the ﬁrms 0, 1, and 2: merge, not to
merge, or break off the merger. As discussed in the introduction, in the presence of more than two decision
makers, it is not sufﬁcient to analyze the decision by the owners of the ﬁrms of each particular case, and we
should examine stable market structures. In this paper, we invoke the core, the well-established solution
concept in cooperative game theory, and focus on examining which of the market structures is/are stable.
To deﬁne the core of the market structures, we should start with the deﬁnition of a blocking market
structure. A market structure M is said to block another market structure M 0 if there exists a deviant
coalition of the owner(s) of the pre-marged ﬁrm(s) such that:
(i) M can be constructed from M 0 by solely the decision by the owner(s) in the deviant
coalition, and
(ii) every owner in the coalition achieves strictly higher payoff inM than inM 0.
An example will help understanding the deﬁnition of blocking. LetM ff0;1g;f2ggb=0:5 be the market structure
composed of the merged ﬁrm 01 with b = 0:5 and the private ﬁrm 2. In this case, for example, the
coalition of the owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 2, f0;2g, can construct, if they want, the new market structure
that consists of the merged ﬁrm 02 with b = 0:45 and the private ﬁrm 1, denoted by M ff0;2gf1ggb=0:45 . If
the owner of the ﬁrm 2 gains more payoff, i.e. the distributed proﬁt, and the owner of the ﬁrm 0, i.e.
the government, also achieves higher payoff, i.e. social welfare, in the new structureM ff0;2gf1ggb=0:45 than in
M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=0:5 , then the structureM
ff0;2gf1gg
b=0:45 blocksM
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=0:5 . Note that it is also possible that a deviant
coalition consists of a single owner of a pre-merged ﬁrm. In the above example, it is possible for each of
the owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms 0 and 1 to deviate from the structure by breaking off the merger and
to operate their own pre-merged ﬁrms respectively, i.e. to shift into the mixed triopoly, as well. The core
of the market structures is deﬁned as:
the set of market structures that are never blocked by any other market structure.
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We denote the core of the market structures by Co. If a market structure is in the core, all of the three
owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms have no incentive to construct a new market structure. In this sense, the
market structure in the core can be regarded as the stable one. In the next section, we examine which of
the market structures is/are in the core.
3 Results
We now explore the core of the market structures, i.e. stable structures. Our argument proceeds through
some lemmata, each of which points out the market structures which are blocked by some other market
structure. Our ﬁrst lemma shows that the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 012 is not in the core no
matter what a ratio of shareholding by the pre-merged ﬁrms is adopted.
Lemma 1. For any ratio of shareholding by the three owners of the pre-merged ﬁrms, the market structure
of the merged ﬁrm 012,M ff0;1;2ggg;d , can not belong to the core, i.e.M
ff0;1;2gg
g;d 62 Co, for any g 2 [0;1] and
any d 2 [0;1].
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof proceeds in two steps.
Step 1. LetM ff0;1;2ggg2[0;1];d= 12
be the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 012 with g 2 [0;1] and d = 12 , and
M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b2[0;1] be that of the public-private merged ﬁrm 01 and the private ﬁrm 2 with a ratio of shareholding
b 2 [0;1] in the merged ﬁrm 01. We will show that the owner of the private ﬁrm 2 wants to deviate from
the merger among the three ﬁrms. Since
dV c2 (b )
db =
12(2¡b )
(¡11+4b )3 a
2 < 0; 8b 2 [0;1]; (14)
we have
min
b2[0;1]
V c2 (b ) =V
c
2 (b )
¯¯
b=1 =
2
49a
2: (15)
Then, solving the following equation:
V d2 (g;d )
¯¯
d= 12
= 249a
2; (16)
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we obtain the result
V d2 (g;d )
¯¯
d= 12
= min
b2[0;1]
V c2 (b ) if g =
93¡7p41
90 ¼ 0:5353: (17)
Since
d
¡
V d2 (g;d )jd= 12
¢
dg =¡3(32¡27g)2(8¡3g)3 a2 < 0, 8g 2 [0;1], we obtain
V d2 (g;d )
¯¯
d= 12
< min
b2[0;1]
V c2 (b ); 8g 2
¡93¡7p41
90 ;1
¤
: (18)
Therefore, if g > 93¡7
p
41
90 , the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 2 deviates fromM
ff0;1;2gg
g2[0;1];d= 12
and operates
her/his own ﬁrm regardless of what a ratio b is, i.e. M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[0;1] blocks M
ff0;1;2gg
g2[0;1];d= 12
. In cases where
d 6= 12 , the same conclusion also follows for one of the owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms, 1 or 2,
because one of them inevitably receives strictly less payoff than in the case of d = 12 .
Step 2. Let I be the interval
£
0; 93¡7
p
41
90
¤
. To complete the proof, we have to show thatM ff0;1;2ggg2I ;d2[0;1]
is blocked by some other market structure. Consider the market structure of the public-private merged
ﬁrm 01 and the private ﬁrm 2 with a ratio of shareholding b = g , i.e. M ff0;1g;f2ggb=g . We show that the
coalition f0;1g has an incentive to deviate from the merger among the three ﬁrms if d = 12 . Let b :R!R
be such that b (t) = t. When g = 93¡7
p
41
90 , the difference between the payoffs to the owner of the ﬁrm 0
across the two market structures is
¡
V c0 (b (g))¡V d0 (g)
¢¯¯
g= 93¡7
p
41
90
= 25(1024237+79947
p
41)
98(32396969+4258989
p
41)
a2 > 0: (19)
Moreover, we have
d
¡
V c0 (b (g))¡V d0 (g)
¢
dg =¡3(6859¡13655g+9324g
2¡2682g3+279g4)
(8¡3g)3(11¡4g)3 a
2 < 0; 8g 2 [0;1]: (20)
Therefore, the government can achieve higher payoff, i.e. higher social welfare, inM ff0;1g;f2ggb=g than in
M
ff0;1;2gg
g2I ;d= 12
. Similarly, we obtain the following results on the payoff to the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm
1,
¡
V c1 (b (g))¡V d1 (g;d )
¢¯¯
g= 93¡7
p
41
90 ;d=
1
2
= (2267+51177
p
41)
196(309+14
p
41)2
a2 > 0; (21)
11
d
¡
V c1 (b (g))¡V d1 (g;d )jd= 12
¢
dg =¡3(5024¡8031g+5460g
2¡1759g3+216g4)
2(8¡3g)3(11¡4g)3 a
2 < 0; 8g 2 [0;1]: (22)
Thus, the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 1 can gain more payoff inM ff0;1g;f2ggb=g than inM
ff0;1;2gg
g2I ;d= 12
. Thus,
the joint deviation by f0;1g is beneﬁcial to each of the owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 1. The same argument as
in the step 1 can be directly applied to any case of d 6= 12 to show that the market structures of the merger
among the three ﬁrms is blocked through the joint deviation of the government and one of the owners of
the pre-merged private ﬁrms.
As shown in the proof of the lemma, when the ratio of shareholding by the government in the merged
ﬁrm 012 is not so high, more precisely g 2 £0; 93¡7p4190 ¤, the owners of public ﬁrm 0 and of the pre-merged
private ﬁrm i (distributed weakly less payoff than the other pre-merged private ﬁrm j 6= i) can achieve
higher payoffs (social welfare and the distributed proﬁt, respectively) if they deviate from the merger
among the three ﬁrms and organize the new merged ﬁrm 0i with a suitably chosen ratio of shareholding.
On the other hand, in the case where g is high enough, or g 2 £93¡7p4190 ;1¤ precisely, either of the two
owners of pre-merged private ﬁrms, say i, has an incentive to deviate from the merged ﬁrm 012 since
s/he can gain more payoff if s/he manage her/his own pre-merged private ﬁrm i in the market that will be
realized after her/his deviation. In both cases, the key is that the positive effect of the improvement on
productivity in the merger among the three ﬁrms is relatively small to the merger between two ﬁrms.
Next, we provide our second lemma which tells that at least one of the two owners of the pre-merged
private ﬁrms prefers the mixed triopoly rather than the merger between these two private ﬁrms regardless
of what a ratio of the shareholding between them is adopted, i.e. the market structure of the merger
between the private ﬁrms is not in the core no matter what a ratio of shareholding is in the merged ﬁrm.
Lemma 2. For any ratio of shareholding a 2 [0;1], the market structure of the merger between the private
ﬁrms,M ff0g;f1;2gga , is blocked by the mixed triopoly,M ff0g;f1g;f2gg.
Proof of Lemma 2. Since we have å2i=1Pai =
16
169a
2 > 332a = P
b
12, it is obvious that there exists no
a 2 [0;1] such that aPb12 ¸Pa1 and (1¡a)Pb12 ¸Pa2.
This result is due to the strengthened market share of the public ﬁrm. Although the merger between
the two private ﬁrms leads to the improvement on productivity, the proﬁt of the merged ﬁrm 12 can not
exceed the sum of the proﬁts gained by the pre-merged private ﬁrms because of the subsequent expansion
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of the market share of the public ﬁrm in the new market structure. Hence, the merger between the private
ﬁrms will never be beneﬁcial to each of the two owners of the pre-merged private ﬁrms.
We now move to our third lemma. While the mixed triopoly, as stated in Lemma 2, blocks the market
structures of the regime (b) and, consequently, excludes them from the core, the following lemma shows
that the mixed triopoly can not belong to the core, either. To state the lemma, we let
b = 638¡39
p
31
739 ¼ 0:56950 and b¯ = 6197¡39
p
6001
5572 ¼ 0:56996: (23)
Lemma 3. The mixed triopoly, M ff0g;f1g;f2gg, is blocked by the market structure of the public-private
merged ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i,M ff0;ig;f jggb , if the ratio of shareholding b in the merged ﬁrm 0i
is in the interval (b ; b¯ ).
Proof of Lemma 3. In the Cournot equilibrium of each of the regimes (a) and (c), we have
V a0 =
99
338a
2; V c0 =
(68¡44b+5b 2)
2(11¡4b )2 a
2; V ai =
8
169a
2; V ci = (1¡b )Pc0i = 9(3¡2b )(1¡b )2(11¡4b )2 a2:
Thus, we obtain the following:8><>:0· b · b )V
a
0 ¸V c0
b < b · 1)V a0 <V c0
and
8><>:0· b < b¯ )V
c
i >V
a
i
b¯ · b · 1)V ci ·V ai :
Thus, each of the owners of 0 and i have an incentive to jointly found the merged ﬁrm 0i if the shareholding
ratio b is in [0; b¯ )\ (b ;1] = (b ; b¯ ).
As we have just shown in the proof of Lemma 3, if the ratio of shareholding by the government is more
than b , i.e. b > b , the government will agree to the merger with a private ﬁrm i since she can achieve
higher social welfare by the positive effect of productivity improvement. On the other hand, the owner
of the pre-merged private ﬁrm i can gain more payoff in the merged ﬁrm 0i than in the mixed triopoly
whenever b < b¯ . Therefore, for any b 2 (b ; b¯ ), both of the two owners have an incentive to merge into
a new public-private ﬁrm 0i. From this observation, we immediately obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4. The mixed triopoly,M ff0g;f1g;f2gg, blocks the market structure of the public-private merged
ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i,M ff0;ig;f jggb , whenever the ratio of shareholding b in the merged ﬁrm 0i
is in [0;b ) or (b¯ ;1], i.e. b 2 [0;b )[ (b¯ ;1].
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Proof of Lemma 4. This lemma immediately follows from the proof of Lemma 3 where we have
shown that if b 2 (b¯ ;1] (resp. [0;b )) then the owner of the private ﬁrm i (resp. the owner of the public
ﬁrm 0) has an incentive to deviate and change the present market structure into the mixed triopoly.
From Lemmata 1 to 4, we now know that almost all market structures can not be in the core. The
market structures that belong to any of the regimes (a), (b), and (d) are not in the core. Moreover, in
the regime (c), the market structures with b 2 [0;b )[ (b¯ ;1] can not belong to the core, either. As a
consequence, the remaining candidates that could belong to the core are the market structures of the
public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i, with the ratio of shareholding by the government
b 2 [b ; b¯ ]. We now state our main result, which shows that any of these market structures is in the core.
Proposition 1. The market structure of the public-private merged ﬁrm 0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i,
M
ff0;ig;f jgg
b , is in the core whenever the ratio of shareholding in the merged ﬁrm 0i, b , is in the closed
interval [b ; b¯ ], i.e.M ff0;ig;f jggb 2 Co, 8b 2 [b ; b¯ ].
Proof of Proposition 1. LetM ff0;ig;f jggb2[b ;b¯ ] be the market structure of the merged ﬁrm 0i with a ratio
of shareholding b 2 [b ; b¯ ] and the private ﬁrm j (6= i). In a series of claims below, we will show that
M
ff0;ig;f jgg
b2[b ;b¯ ] is never blocked by any other market structure. We assume, without loss of generality, i= 1
and j = 2.
Claim 1. M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is never blocked by the mixed triopoly in any case of b 2 [b ; b¯ ].
By Lemma 3,M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is not blocked by the mixed triopoly if b 2 (b ; b¯ ). Moreover, in the proof
of Lemma 3, we have shown that, in the case of b = b , the government inM ff0;1g;f2ggb=b can achieve the
same level of social welfare as in the mixed triopoly, and thus the government has no incentive to deviate
from M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] , and also that the owner of the pre-merged ﬁrm 1 in M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=b gains more payoff
than in the mixed triopoly. Thus, neither of these two owners want to break off the merger. The case of
b = b¯ can be proved by the symmetric argument to the case of b = b .
Claim 2. M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is never blocked by the market structure of the public ﬁrm 0 and the private
merged ﬁrm 12 with a 2 [0;1],M ff0g;f1;2gga2[0;1] , in any case of a 2 [0;1].
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By (14), V c2 (b ) is decreasing on [0;1], and thus we have
min
b2[b ;b¯ ]
V c2 (b ) =V
c
2 (b¯ ) =
(1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2: (24)
When b = b¯ in M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] , i.e. in M
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=b¯ , the owner of the private ﬁrm 2 will agree with the
merger between the two private ﬁrms if and only if
V b2 (a)>V
c
2 (b¯ ), 332(1¡a)a2 > (1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2 (25a)
, a < 401707¡1768
p
6001
621075 ¼ 0:4263: (25b)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payoffs to the ﬁrm 1: for any a < 401707¡1768
p
6001
621075 ,
V b1 (a)¡V c1 (b¯ ) = 332aa2¡ 8169a2 (26a)
< 332aa
2
¯¯¯
a= 401707¡1768
p
6001
621075
¡ 8169a2 (26b)
= 88107¡1768
p
6001
6624800 a
2 ¼¡0:0074a2 < 0: (26c)
Thus, by (25b) and (26c), the joint deviation by the owners of the ﬁrms 1 and 2 can not be realized if
b = b¯ . Since V c2 is decreasing with respect to b , by (25a) to (26c) altogether, the joint deviation by the
owners of the private ﬁrms is still impossible in any case of b 2 [b ; b¯ ).
Claim 3. M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is never blocked byM
ff0;2g;f1gg
b 02[0;1] in any case of b
0 2 [0;1].
We start with the case of b = b¯ in M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] . In this case, the owner of the ﬁrm 2 prefers
M
ff0;2g;f1gg
b 02[0;1] rather thanM
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=b¯ if and only if the payoff, i.e. the distributed proﬁt, inM
ff0;2g;f1gg
b 02[0;1] is
strictly greater than the payoff, i.e. the stand-alone proﬁt, gained inM ff0;1g;f2ggb=b¯ , i.e. the following value,
D(b 0), must be positive:
D(b 0) := (1¡b 0)Pc02(b 0)¡Pc2(b¯ ) (27a)
= 9(3¡2b
0)(1¡b 0)
2(11¡4b 0)2 a
2¡ (1649+13
p
6001)2
1352(234+
p
6001)2
a2 (27b)
= a2 ¢X(b 0); (27c)
where X(b 0) = 28(12134951+89440
p
6001)(b 0)2¡2(379922845+2615912p6001)b 0+328599497+1677091p6001
676(234+
p
6001)2(11¡4b 0)2 . Solving the
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equation D(b 0) = 0 subject to b 0 2 [0;1], we obtain
b 0¤ =
¡
379922845+2615912
p
6001¡39
p
31920488675573+391144962052
p
6001
¢
339778628+2504320
p
6001
¼ 0:5151: (28)
Since
dD(b 0)
db 0 =
d((1¡b 0)Pc02(b 0))
db 0 =¡9(31¡24b
0)
2(11¡4b 0)3 a
2 < 0; 8b 0 2 [0;1]; (29)
we obtain the intermediate result that the owner of the ﬁrm 2 prefersM ff0;2g;f1ggb 02[0;1] toM
ff0;1g;f2gg
b=b¯ if and
only if
b 0 2 [0;b 0¤): (30)
On the other hand, since we have
dV c0 (b )
db =
3(10¡11b )
(11¡4b )3 a
2 > 0; 8b 2 [0; b¯ ] ¡) [0;b 0¤]¢; (31)
the owner of the public ﬁrm 0 strictly prefersM ff0;1g;f2ggb=b¯ rather thanM
ff0;2g;f1gg
b 0 if b
0 < b 0¤ (< b¯ ), and
thus the joint deviation by the owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 2 fromM ff0;1g;f2ggb=b¯ can never be realized. Note
that, from (14), the proﬁt (or payoff to the owner) of the ﬁrm 2 inM ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is decreasing with respect
to b , which in turn implies that, by (27a) to (27c) and (29), a decrease in b leads to a decrease in b 0¤.
Thus, from the fact that b 0¤ < b and (31), the owner of the ﬁrm 0 never agrees with the joint deviation
with the owner of the ﬁrm 2 in any case of b 2 [b ; b¯ ).
Claim 4. M ff0;1g;f2ggb2[b ;b¯ ] is never blocked by the merger among the three ﬁrmsM
ff0;1;2gg
g2[0;1];d2[0;1] regardless
of what the ratios g 2 [0;1] and d 2 [0;1] are.
We start with the case of b = b . In this case, we have V c0 (b ) =
99
338a
2. Since dV
d
0 (g)
dg =
27(1¡g)
(8¡3g)3 a
2 ¸ 0
for all g 2 [0;1] (equality holds only in the case of g = 1),
V d0 (g)¡V c0 (b ) = 3(11¡9g)(¡23+33g)338(8¡3g)2 a2 > 0; 8g 2 (2333 ;1]: (32)
On the other hand, we obtain the following result on the payoff to the owner of the pre-merged private
ﬁrm 2:
d(V d2 (g;d )jd=0)
dg =
3(32¡27g)
(¡8+3g)3 a
2 < 0; 8g 2 [0;1] (33)
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and
V d2 (g;d )
¯¯
g= 2333 ;d=0
¡V c2 (b ) = 4(817¡260
p
31)
616005 a
2 ¼¡0:0041a2 < 0: (34)
Note that the case of d = 0 is the most favorable case of d for the owner of the pre-merged private ﬁrm 2.
Hence, in the case of b = b , by (32) to (34), the owners of the pre-merged public ﬁrm 0 and pre-merged
private ﬁrm 2 can never reach an agreement about the shareholding in the merged ﬁrm 012, and thus the
merger among the three ﬁrms can never be realized. Now, we examine the other cases of b 2 [b ; b¯ ], i.e.
b 2 (b ; b¯ ]. By (31), the value of g¤ which solves the equation V d0 (g)¡V c0 (b ) = 0 increases in any case
of b 2 (b ; b¯ ] than in the case of b = b , i.e. g¤ > 2333 . From (14) and (33), we have
V d2 (g
¤;d )jd=0¡V c2 (b )
¯¯
b2(b ;b¯ ] <V
d
2 (g;d )
¯¯
g= 2333 ;d=0
¡V c2 (b¯ ) (35a)
= 13739¡221
p
6001
828100 a
2 ¼¡0:0041a2 < 0: (35b)
Therefore, by the same argument as in the case of b = b , the merger among the three ﬁrms is impossible
in any case of b 2 (b ; b¯ ].
From (31) and the fact that dV
c
1 (b )
db = ¡9(31¡24b )2(11¡4b )3 a2 < 0, 8b 2 [0;1], any alteration on the ratio b
never improves the payoffs to both owners of the ﬁrms 0 and 1 simultaneously. Therefore, combining the
assertions of the claims, we have successfully shown thatM ff0;1g;f2ggb is in the core whenever b is in the
closed interval [b ; b¯ ].
From this proposition, it can be concluded that the market structures of the public-private merged ﬁrm
0i and the private ﬁrm j 6= i with b 2 [b ; b¯ ] are stable in the sense that any of these market structures is
never blocked by the other market structures. In other words, once any of these structures is realized, it
will never be replaced by any of the other market structures. It should be emphasized that the interval of
the admissible ratio b in the core [b ; b¯ ] is very short, b¯ ¡b ¼ 0:00047. This result is fairly remarkable
in that it shows a considerable contrast to the result obtained in Kamijo and Nakamura (2007). In their
paper, Kamijo and Nakamura analyzed the industry composed by two symmetric private ﬁrms and a less
efﬁcient public ﬁrm. Assuming that each of the three ﬁrms has constant marginal cost of production,
Kamijo and Nakamura showed that all of the four regimes, except for the regime (b), have the market
structures that belong to the core. Therefore, it can be said that the stable mergers in mixed oligopoly
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crucially depend on the assumptions of ﬁrms’ technology.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper explored the stable market structures in mixed oligopoly when a single public ﬁrm and two
symmetric private ﬁrms in the homogeneous good market are allowed to freely merge and freely break
off the merger. We adopted the core as the solution concept to analyze the stability of market structures.
We showed that the core consists solely of the market structures derived by the merger between a public
ﬁrm and one of the two private ﬁrms with the shareholding ratio by the public ﬁrm, b , which is greater
than b ¼ 0:56950 and less than b¯ ¼ 0:56996. These market structures are stable in the sense that, by the
deﬁnition of the core, once any of these market structures is actually realized, it never be replaced by any
of the other market structures. The admissible interval of b that ensures the stability of market structures
is very short. This strong result fairly relies on the assumption that a merger yields the improvement on
productivity. Without such a positive effect of a merger, our result would change and the mixed triopoly
would be a unique stable market structure.
Two interesting extensions of our model remain. The ﬁrst is to consider the model in which the
foreign shareholders are taken into account. In the real world, some ﬁrms are foreign-owned. In this case,
social welfare that the government is to maximize should not include the proﬁts of the foreign-owned
ﬁrms. Thus, the existence of the foreign shareholders will change the public ﬁrm’s decision making
and, consequently, the equilibrium outcomes as well. The other possible extension is to introduce the
asymmetricity among the production technologies of ﬁrms in the market. In the present paper, we assumed
that all the three ﬁrms have identical technologies, represented by the quadratic cost function. It seems
more natural to assume that a public ﬁrm shows inefﬁcient performance relatively to private ﬁrms, e.g.
X-inefﬁciency in a public ﬁrm. These issues are left for future reseach.
18
References
Ba´rcena-Ruiz, J.C. and M.B. Garzo´n, (2003), “Mixed Duopoly, Merger and Multiproduct Firms,” Journal
of Economics, 80, 27-42.
Barros, P.P., (1998), “Endogenous Merger and Size Asymmetry of Merger Participants,” Economics Let-
ters, 60, 113-119.
Coloma, G.,(2006), “Mergers and Acquisitions in Mixed-Oligopoly Markets,” International Journal of
Business and Economics, 5, 147-159.
De Fraja, G. and F. Delbono, (1989), “Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly,” Oxford
Economic Papers, 41, 302-311.
Deneckere, A.F. and C. Davidson, (1985), “Incentive to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition,”
RAND Journal of Economics, 16, 473-486.
Farrell, J. and C. Shapiro, (1990), “Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis,” American Economic
Review, 80, 107-126.
Horn, H. and L. Persson, (2001), “Endogenous Merger in Concentrated Markets,” International Journal
of Industrial Organization, 1213-1244.
Kamijo, Y. and Y. Nakamura, (2007) “StableMarket Structures fromMerger Activities inMixed Oligopoly
with Asymmetric Costs,” mimeo, May.
McAfee, R.P. andM.A.Williams, (1992), “Horizontal Mergers and Antitrust Policy,” Journal of Industrial
Economics, 40, 181-187.
Matsumura, T., (1998), “Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly,” Journal of Public Economics, 70, 473-
483.
Nakamura, Y. and T. Inoue, (2007), “Mixed Oligopoly and Productive-Improving Mergers,” mimeo, May.
Salant, S.W., S. Switzer and R.J. Reynolds, (1983), “Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of
an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 98, 185-199.
19
Straume, O.R., (2006), “Managerial Delegation and Merger Incentives with Asymmetric Costs,” Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 162, 450-469.
20
